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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Larry R. VonWald 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. Case No. 940731-CA 
Kevin Plumb, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Plaintiff-appellant [VonWald] herewith makes and 
files his petition for rehearing pursuant to Rule 35, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, as to the memorandum 
decision of the Court dated and filed May 25, 1995, as 
follows: 
Points of law or fact the Court overlooked or 
misapprehended: 
Without referencing the particular language and 
without subjecting that language to appropriate analysis, 
the Court of Appeals in its memorandum decision 
,fconclude[s] that jjfc [paragraph 7 of the parties' Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement] creates a condition precedent 
which failed due to Plumb's inability to gain county 
1 
approval of his plans." 
The Court/s conclusion violates the "plain and 
ordinary meaning" rule of interpretation of contract 
terms [Equitable Life and Gas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 
1187, 1192 (Utah App. 1993)] when taken with the explicit 
and operative terms of the part of paragraph 7 upon which 
the Court and defendant relies to establish a condition 
precedent; i.e., Buyer to pay for topographic study for 
property and obtaining approval of building plans by Salt 
Lake County with 30 days of seller providing evidence of 
clear and marketable title immediately followed by 
[c]losing shall be within 30 days of seller providing 
buyer evidence of satisfaction of liens and providing 
clear and marketable title. 
Of course it is necessary that appellee Plumb pay, 
or that he agrees to pay, the expenses for topographic 
studies and for building plans because these are lienable 
by those engineers or architects providing those services 
and this is all that paragraph 7 of the contract requires 
according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms 
employed by the parties, i.e., that Plumb "pay for a 
topographic study and [for] county approval of building 
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plans within thirty days of seller providing evidence of 
clear and marketable title." A contract is read in 
accordance with its express terms and the plain meaning 
thereof. C. Sanchez and Son, Inc. v. U.S., 6 F.3rd 1539 
(Fed. Cir 1993). 
The Court,s interpretation of the provision in 
question establishing the obtaining of county approval of 
building plans as a "condition precedent" to appellee 
Plumb's liability should therefore, in the absence of 
additional language which clearly shows obtaining county 
approval of building plans is a "condition precedent", be 
reheard and vacated. The subject contractual provisions 
are not ambiguous and do not create a condition 
precedent. "As a general rule conditions precedent are 
not favored and the courts are not inclined to construe 
a contractual provision as a condition precedent unless 
such construction is plainly and unambiguously required 
by the language of the contract. See Minthorne v. 
Seeburg Corp., 397 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1968), cert, denied 
397 U.S. 1036, 90 S.Ct. 1357, 25 L.Ed.2d 647 (1970); 
Restatement of Contracts Sec. 261 (1932); Watson Const. 
Co. v. Reppel Steel & Supply, 598 P.2d 116 (Ariz.App. 
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1985). 
The Court's further conclusion as to "Plumb's 
inability to gain county approval of his plans11 is 
without evidentiary support and a genuine issue of 
material fact, precluding summary judgment, existed as to 
whether Plumb acted reasonably in not submitting 
"building plans" which the contract requires, for county 
approval to the appropriate county agency even if a 
condition precedent is found. 
Here, only a drawing, labelled "site plan," [not a 
building plan] was submitted to a county functionary who, 
by reference to county regulations, rejected the driveway 
which was indicated on the drawing submitted by Plumb 
because of gradation stages claimed to be out of line 
with regulations. The contract provision is as to 
"county approval of building plans" which were never 
submitted; had they been, approval might have been 
forthcoming from the appropriate county agency, even with 
the indicated driveway gradation which showed an 
insubstantial variation from those prescribed by county 
regulation. "A genuine issue of material fact precluding 
summary judgment arises when the nonmovant presents 
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When this matter was decided on motion for summary 
judgment, the nonmovant's version of the underlying facts 
must be believed, and judgment can not be sustained in 
favor of the movant unless there is no version of the 
facts that could support a contract interpretation in 
favor of nonmovant. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250, 
106 S.Ct. at 2511. There is only one meaning that is 
reasonably consistent with the contract language; i.e., 
that ascribed above, to-wit, within 30 days of VonWald 
providing evidence of clear and marketable title, Plumb 
is to pay for a topographic study and for county approval 
of building plans. 
The well-settled rule of contract interpretation is 
that conditions are disfavored and will not be found in 
the absence of unambiguous language indicating the 
intention to create a conditional obligation. In re 
Bubble Up Delaware, Inc., 684 F.2d 1259, 1264 (9th Cir. 
1982); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Heller, 65 F.R.D. 83, 93 
(S.D.N.Y.1974); see Prager's, Inc., v. Bullitt, 1 
Wash.App. 575, 463 P.2d 217, 222 (1969); 3A A. Corbin, 
Corbin on Contracts Sec. 635 (1960); 5 S. Williston, A 
Treatise on the Law of Contracts Sec. 665 (W. Jaeger 3d 
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ed. 1961). 
It would not have been difficult for Plumb to have 
inserted appropriate language. A provision that county 
approval of Plumb,s site plan would be necessary or 
required might signal such a contingency, as might the 
inclusion of a formal mechanism for obtaining the 
approval. Instead, paragraph 7 indicates that "Buyer to 
pay for topographic study for property and obtaining 
approval of building plans by Salt Lake County with 30 
days of seller providing evidence of clear and marketable 
title" and "closing . . . within 30 days of seller 
providing buyer evidence of satisfaction of liens and 
providing clear and marketable title" [paragraph 7(B) and 
8] whether county approval of building plans had been 
obtained or not. 
This Court, and the trial court, under the facts and 
the law, erred in regard to their construction and 
application of paragraph 7 of the Earnest Money Sale 
Agreement. 
WHEREFORE, appellant VonWald prays that rehearing be 
granted after which the Memorandum Decision of May 25, 
1995, be ordered vacated and set aside. The undersigned 
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certifies that this petition is presented in good faith 
and not for delay. 
DATED June 8, 1995. 
LARRY L/WHYTE 
On June 8, 1995, two copies of the foregoing 
PETITION FOR REHEARING mailed as follows: 
Dennis K. Poole 
Andrea Nuffer 
Dennis K. Poole & Associates 
4543 South 700 East, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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